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Abstract 
 
This discussion paper analyzes a sample of 2014-2016 Russian-language publications focused on 
Russia’s security relations with the United States. It characterizes the Russian expert debate at 
that time as dichotomous in nature, where security policy analysts proposed either coercive or 
restrained policy approaches in dealing with perceived threats. It assesses similarities and 
differences of these two perspectives with regard to the nature of Russia’s political-military 
relationship with the West, as well as past challenges and then-future opportunities in nuclear 
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Introduction  
 
Since the beginning of the 2014 crisis in Ukraine, U.S./NATO-Russian relations have been in a 
tailspin. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its support of pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine, and 
numerous coercive actions aimed against NATO allies have contributed to a breakdown of 
political-military relations. The United States and European Union members have imposed 
political and economic sanctions on Russia, and NATO allies have cut substantive military 
cooperation. These actions, however, have not induced desired changes in Russian policy. 
Russia’s own responses and sanctions, in turn, did not induce its desired changes in Western 
policies. Moscow’s alleged intervention into electoral processes in the United States and in 
Europe has destabilized political relations even further, dashing already slim hopes for 
constructive engagement on critical issues affecting mutual security interests.  
 
Across the Euro-Atlantic region, conventional, nuclear, and air/missile defense postures have 
continued to adapt to changing threat perceptions. U.S. and Russian militaries’ close proximity in 
the European theater as well as in Syria has highlighted the importance of even limited military-
to-military coordination aimed at minimizing the risks of unintended conflict. As the United 
States and Russia—as well as other countries, most notably, China—continue to pursue 
capabilities that challenge established bilateral notions of strategic stability, managing 
perceptions and escalation dangers is bound to remain a difficult task for the foreseeable future.  
In this newly dangerous security environment, discussions about “strategic stability” have proven 
difficult. The sides are yet to embrace any of the cooperative proposals developed in the few 
Track II forums that have continued to meet since the Ukraine crisis began, and even proposals 
for risk reduction have been viewed with great suspicion. Instead, they have engaged in a “war of 
words,” with media coverage amplifying respective concerns and speculations about the other 
side’s capabilities and intentions.  
 
In the United States, the broader analytical community has largely struggled to understand the 
drivers of Russian political-military behavior. For example, there is an active debate about 
whether the Ukraine conflict offers evidence of offensive or defensive intentions on Russia’s 
part. This debate contributes to ongoing concerns about the potential vulnerability of U.S. allies 
in the Baltic states to Russian “hybrid warfare.” Some further argue that Russia’s use of coercive 
signaling and nuclear language around the Ukraine conflict may suggest Russia’s potential 
willingness to invade these states and engage in limited use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons to 
end the conflict on its terms.  
 
Given the seemingly important role of the Russian military in driving Russian political-military 
engagement with the United States and NATO, some Western analysts have suggested that the 
concept of “strategic deterrence” (стратегическое сдерживание) could offer an important lens 
through which to analyze key aspects of Russian behavior toward the West. Thus, with an eye 
toward exploring this possibility, this discussion paper examined select Russian-language 
military and security policy publications to answer the following questions:  
 
• How do Russian military and security analysts view the most serious threats to their 
country?  
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• How do they think Russia should respond, particularly on issues affecting political and 
military relations with the United States and NATO? 
• What do these views suggest about the future evolution of Russian policy and strategy 
with regard to conventional and nuclear arms control issues?2  
 
This paper argues that far from being monolithic, the Russian security policy community could 
be viewed as having two dominant perspectives. Military and conservative analysts, writing in 
journals such as Military Thought and outlets like Russia in Global Affairs, focus primarily on 
Russia’s improvement of its strategic deterrence capabilities and how Russia could use nuclear, 
conventional, and non-military threats to coerce the West. By contrast, security policy analysts 
from Russia’s leading international affairs universities such at IMEMO, ISKRAN, and others 
argue for a modicum of restraint, noting that some Russian policies have been based on an 
exaggerated threat from the West. 
 
Highlighting the differences and similarities between these two perspectives is a simplistic 
approach from an analytical standpoint, but it could still offer some valuable insights. For 
example, even though one of them views risk manipulation as an important tool that could be 
used against the West, both perspectives are generally defensive in nature. In addition, the two 
perspectives generally agree that cooperation with the West could help address some of the other 
security challenges Russia faces, including reduction of nuclear risks and strategic stability in a 
format that potentially includes China. 
 
The section that follows lays out the two perspectives. The paper then offers an overview of the 
policy issues, moving from political-military issues in U.S./NATO-Russian relations to 
functional topics. It concludes with a summary and a table.  
 
 
The Two Perspectives  
 
Russia’s Military Doctrine and its Foreign Policy Concept offer a baseline of Moscow’s 
assessment of its external environment and threat perception. Both documents discuss perceived 
dangers from U.S./NATO’s readiness to use military force and inability to terminate conflicts. 
They also address internal instability and terrorism that could challenge Russia’s sovereignty, as 
well as local conflicts on the country’s vast borders that could escalate, including potentially to 
the use of nuclear weapons. Other concerns include military-technological developments, 
including U.S. and allied missile defense, prompt global strike systems and concepts, 
information technologies, and dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
technologies to state and non-state actors.1  
 
In the sample of 2014-2016 publications assessed for this paper, there were two dominant 
perspectives about how Moscow should prioritize and respond to these perceived threats. Some 
analysts viewed Russia’s relations with the United States and NATO from a prism of a long-term 
struggle that originated from perceived Western efforts to diminish Russia’s role in the region 
and the world. Others saw the West not as Russia’s enduring competitor, but as a potential 
                                                
2 This paper does not include substantive discussions of information security, nonproliferation, or counterterrorism 
issues.  
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cooperative partner. They emphasized the importance of restraint and positive leadership that 
could help to induce positive changes in Russia’s security environment.  
 
Russia Needs to Deter and Coerce the West 
Some Russian analysts viewed their country as the underdog in a struggle against the West. In 
journals such as Military Thought, they discussed the West’s war against Russia, which it has 
continued to wage since the end of the Cold War primarily through globalization and information 
war activities. “The West will only rest at a point where our country and our people will be 
reduced to a state in which they will be laughed at and despised,” S.A. Bogdanov and S.G. 
Chekinov proclaimed.2  
 
Russia’s response to this challenge from the West was described by analysts as its own “strategic 
deterrence.” This approach was based on the premise of Russia’s asymmetry vis-a-vis the West. 
Due to budget constraints, Russia could not match Western conventional capabilities, but this did 
not preclude the pursuit or demonstration of stronger conventional capabilities or nuclear 
modernization. Its deterrence efforts needed to be asymmetric and draw on psychological 
effects.3 Russia’s Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov and others have focused 
analytical thinking on the changing nature of conflict, arguing that the West uses non-military 
means (including cyber and information war) to destabilize countries, and Russia thus should, 
too. Authoritative political analysts such as Sergey Karaganov and Fyodor Lukyanov (of Russia 
in Global Affairs) also argued that Russia’s coercive efforts and stronger conventional and 
nuclear capabilities are key to its ability to secure its interests and counter the West.  
 
Some military analysts from research institutes of the Russian Ministry of Defense described 
strategic deterrence as primarily a defensive strategy that sought to prevent conflict and control 
escalation if a conflict broke out. It aimed to “induce fear” in opponents and has elements of 
deterrence, containment, and compellence.4  Other authoritative writers and practitioners focused 
on the importance of tailoring non-military means, and the direct and indirect uses of military 
force, to achieve desired effects.5 However, Russia’s ability to tailor these tools precisely to their 
Western counterparts’ understanding has been unclear.   
 
The use of nuclear language around the Ukraine crisis illustrates the potential for tailoring errors 
or miscommunication. As a 2016 Swedish Defense Agency report noted, “the Russian 
Ambassador to Denmark threatened Denmark with Russian nuclear missiles should Denmark 
join NATO’s missile defence, and at a meeting with the so-called Elbe Group in March 2015, the 
Russian envoys allegedly said that Russia would use its nuclear weapons if NATO moved more 
forces into Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia.”6 To be sure, such threats could have reflected an 
entrepreneurial esprit de corps among Russian appointees and formers. However, they were 
treated by some Western analysts as official Russian policy, especially when interpreted in 
concert with Russia’s coercive demonstration of its conventional and nuclear capabilities.   
 
Some Russian analysts posit that discussions of Russia as a nuclear danger is Western 
propaganda.7 Others are dismissive of the now-infamous remark by a highly-rated Russian 
journalist about Russia’s ability to turn its adversaries into “radioactive ash” as a “provocation.” 
However, they also note that Russian threats and activities make Western policymakers think 
twice about the dangers of great power conflict and escalation, especially in Syria.8  
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Russia’s President Vladimir Putin himself said, during an October 2016 meeting with Western 
analysts and journalists, that “brandishing nuclear weapons is the last thing to do. This is harmful 
rhetoric, and I do not welcome it.”9 It wasn’t clear, however, whether this statement represented 
a policy change.   
 
Russia Should Exercise Restraint, Positive Leadership  
Political analysts at Russia’s international affairs institutions rarely, if ever, used the term 
“strategic deterrence” in their work. They instead advocated a lesser emphasis on coercive 
approaches, even ones that draw on indirect uses of military force. Scholars such as Andrei 
Zagorski, Sergei Oznobishchev, and Sergey Rogov focused more on past Western and Russian 
actions that have contributed to the current state of affairs as well as institutional challenges of 
bilateral and regional relations. Alexey Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, and Viktor Yesin assessed 
the negative consequences of some of Russia’s anti-Western policies and raised concerns about 
potential costs of an arms race. Pavel Zolotarev has further urged the Russian government to “be 
patient with experts who argue against current policies, are not influenced by propaganda, and 
can critically analyze the government’s actions.”10 
 
Some proponents of restraint posited that the most serious threats to Russia originated not from 
the United States and NATO per se, but from organic instability on Russian borders, changes in 
technology, transnational terrorism, and nuclear proliferation. From this perspective, cooperation 
with the West, especially on arms control and strategic stability, remained critically important to 
Russia’s security. Others pointed out that official Russian denials of engagement in certain 
aspects of conflict in Ukraine have also contributed to Russia’s current inability to reassure the 
West about its lack of hostile intentions toward the Baltic states.11 
 
Once again, the example of the use of nuclear language around the Ukraine conflict is 
instructive. Some have argued that the use of nuclear rhetoric by low-level officials and 
journalists should have been expeditiously curbed by the Russian leadership because it fed a 
Western narrative about Russia being dangerous.12 Others have warned of the need to halt the 
“nuclear psychosis” and the media feeding frenzy on nuclear issues in both Russia and the 
West.13 Most importantly, however, some have argued that, especially in an environment where 
U.S. leadership is uncertain, Russia needs to exercise constructive leadership internationally on 
nuclear arms control and emerging strategic stability issues.14   
 
 
Nature of Russia’s Relationships with the West  
 
As this section notes, the two perspectives differed in regard to the origins and conduct of the 
Ukraine conflict. However, they express similar views about the West’s general attitude toward 
Russia and the importance of regional security institutions.   
 
The Ukraine Conflict 
For proponents of strategic deterrence, Ukraine has been a test case of the new Cold War in 
Russia’s relations with the West. For example, some analysts posited that the “Western-initiated 
process of globalization and Western efforts to control and guide the evolution of human 
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society” have been deliberately anti-Russian. They maintained that, much like the Arab Spring 
and other efforts at promotion of Western democracy and values, Ukraine was a Western-created 
“hybrid” conflict.15 They argued that Russia would continue to oppose the West in such efforts, 
especially across the post-Soviet space. Syria was viewed by some Russian military officials as 
another example of a Western-induced “hybrid” conflict that the Russian intervention helped to 
stabilize. 16  
 
Proponents of restraint, by contrast, suggested that Russia shared some of the blame for the 
regional security situation. Some have argued that Russia’s actions in Ukraine were an 
overreaction to the prospect of that country’s NATO membership.17 Others have posited that 
Russia made errors in relations with its neighbors, especially with Ukraine, and “couldn’t find 
proper tools and balance its historical responsibilities with the importance of maintaining 
stability in its neighboring states.”18 Still others argued that, moving forward, “Russian policies 
need to stop being reactive and need to have a vision for a peaceful process in Ukraine and the 
world as a whole.”19 
 
Russia’s Place and Role  
Russia’s place and role in the Euro-Atlantic region is an issue that received a substantial degree 
of attention and frustration. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has publically stated that it 
is impossible to “unite Europe without a role for Russia,” and that “efforts to do this have ended 
with conflict throughout history.” He has pointed out that new NATO members and other 
countries allied with the United States are not necessarily accepting of Western values (i.e. 
democracy, transparency, responsibility to protect), yet the West does not single them out for 
punishment.20  
 
This narrative of a Western double standard for Russia is pervasive, especially in the writings of 
strategic deterrence proponents. Some of them argued that “the West did not want to include 
Russia in the development of an alternative European system from Vancouver to Vladivostok, 
and is now pushing to make Russia the enemy and recreate the old system of confrontation.”21 
They are generally of the opinion that, when Russia develops strong conventional and nuclear 
capabilities, it will no longer be pushed around by the West.  
 
Even proponents of restraint posited that U.S./NATO-Russian relations broke down in part 
because of the lack of Western respect for Russian interests. In this regard, one analyst has 
argued that a Russian policy change toward the West was “not for the purpose of confrontation 
per se, but because [Russia] decided to no longer put up with the prevailing model of interaction 
with the West, which was not taking into consideration Russian positions and was not 
developing with it equal relations.”22  
 
Across the analytical spectrum, there is a prevailing opinion that the U.S. policy change in 2014 
toward Russia was triggered not by Russia’s annexation of Crimea per se, but was instead due to 
Russia being treated as an unequal partner by the West. In addition, the narrative that the West 
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Institutional Frameworks 
There is considerable debate about how Russia should use existing frameworks for engagement 
with the West to discuss general questions, like deficiencies of the regional security architecture, 
and specific problems, like the conflict over Ukraine. These debates focus primarily on the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the NATO-Russia Council 
(NRC). Both frameworks have significant deficiencies, according to most Russian analysts. 
Some Russian officials bluntly note that the “West preferred NATO to OSCE, [and] used OSCE 
only to criticize Russia on human rights.” They point out that “it is the only institution where 
Russia and West discuss European security, but it is really hard to build consensus” inside of it.24  
 
Echoing official sentiments, one analyst that generally aligns with the strategic deterrence 
perspective has argued for strengthening the military components of the OSCE because that 
organization’s military basket is the only useful one since the “economic basket makes no sense 
and its human rights basket is used to stimulate confrontation.” 25 He has also called for more 
“Eurasian security dialogue” that includes China.26  Some proponents of restraint have instead 
argued for the need to “make the OSCE into European [United Nations] and consider returning 
to Russia’s proposal in 2008 for European security treaty.”27  While likely impractical, these 
proposals are emblematic of frustration with the form and function of Euro-Atlantic institutions.  
 
Even though the NRC was suspended rather than used as an “all-weather” crisis mechanism 
during the Ukraine conflict, both camps viewed the NRC and the NATO-Russia Founding Act 
(NRFA) as important. 28 Some noted that discussions in the NRC should focus on countering 
military escalation and avoiding incidents involving military forces.29  Others argued for the 
importance of discussing hazardous activities and clarifying the NRFA wording with regard to 
permanent stationing of “substantial combat forces.”30 
 
 
Looking Back: Substantive Challenges in the Relationship 
 
The two perspectives differed on the nature of U.S./NATO-Russian engagement on arms control 
going back to the 1980s. Proponents of strategic deterrence viewed the agreements reached by 
USSR General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, especially the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty (INF Treaty), as being fundamentally damaging to Russian interests.31 Proponents of 
restraint saw them as mutually beneficial. For example, they countered that it didn’t matter that 
under the INF treaty, the Soviet Union eliminated twice as many intermediate-range and other 
missiles as the United States did because the treaty eliminated the U.S. Pershing-II missile, 
which Russia considered particularly threatening.32 Many of these debates came to a head after 
the failure to agree on missile defense cooperation or follow-on agreement to New START.  
 
Missile Defense  
To some analysts, the failure to impose restrictions or agree on missile defense cooperation was 
one of the key reasons for Russia’s perception of pervasive insecurity toward the West. Echoing 
Putin, some strategic deterrence proponents have questioned why the Iran nuclear deal didn’t 
lead to a change in U.S. and NATO missile defense policies.33 They have argued that 
U.S./NATO missile defense coupled with changes in NATO conventional posture in Europe 
were intended to provoke Russia.34 They also remained convinced that significant Russian 
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investments into air/missile (aerospace) defense capabilities are essential to, inter alia, deter a 
Western aerospace attack on Russia.  
 
Some proponents of restraint asserted that Russian officials overplayed the threat of current 
Western missile defense capabilities to Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal. One analyst has noted 
that the United States cancelled the European Phased Adaptive Approach’s SM-3 Block 2B 
interceptors that were of particular concern to Russia.35 However, the rejection by the United 
States and NATO of Russia’s proposed “sectoral approach” coupled with the absence of 
policymaker buy-in for the ideas of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative have helped shape this 
group’s perception that Russia’s need for inclusion and assurance was not heard or understood. 
Another analyst has written that, “largely because of the Western position, a substantive dialogue 
on the issue did not take place. The unwillingness of the U.S. to alleviate Moscow’s concerns, 
i.e. provide technical, administrative or legal obligations to guarantee that the system was not 
directed against Russia, led the negotiations to a deadlock.”36  
 
Nuclear Arms Control  
The failed attempts to negotiate further nuclear cuts following New START are another point of 
contention. The Russian government set a list of preconditions that comprised of inclusion of 
third countries in the negotiations, as well as restrictions on prompt global strike, missile 
defense, and weaponization of space.37 In turn, Russian experts on both sides have consistently 
argued that reductions in nonstrategic nuclear weapons were going to be difficult to negotiate. 
 
For example, a 2011 study by one proponent of restraint enumerated various reasons for this 
difficulty, including the continued weakness of Russia’s general purpose forces and other 
conventional capabilities, the absence of natural champions for nonstrategic nuclear arms control 
in the Russian military bureaucracy, and difficulties with verification.38 U.S. development of 
missile defense and prompt global strike capabilities led some proponents of strategic deterrence 
to view President Obama’s focus on pursuing a “nuclear-free world” as a ploy by the United 
States to achieve conventional military superiority.39 Some of these analysts viewed negotiations 
on tactical nuclear weapons as extremely premature, given the weakness of Russia’s general 
purpose forces.40 Others have argued that Russia was wise to not enter into negotiations on 
further nuclear reductions, especially of tactical nuclear weapons, as “these would have even 
further militarized European security.”41   
 
Some proponents of restraint argued that Russia should have extended New START, as U.S. 
President Barack Obama had proposed. Their interpretations of Russian policy at the time, 
however, have differed. One analyst has posited that Russia responded negatively to U.S. offers 
in 2013 and 2016 because it decided that it could get a better deal. He noted that, coupled with 
lack of progress in resolving INF compliance issues during the Obama administration, this 
negative response was a missed opportunity on Russia’s part.42 Another analyst has written, 
though, that Russia became more open to the New START extension in 2014 when Putin stated 
that Russia was ready to seriously discuss the issue. He argued that this statement indicated that 
Russia had dropped its past preconditions, but the Ukraine crisis closed the window of 




CISSM Working Paper | Contrasting Russian Perspectives on Coercion and Restraint 10 
Looking Forward: Potential Areas of Cooperation    
 
As Russia has continued to modernize its conventional and nuclear capabilities and work out 
relevant concepts of operations, there were important disagreements among security analysts 
about threats, needs, and wants. There was some agreement, however, that Russia and the West 
have areas in which limited cooperation was desirable.44  These included, inter alia, managing 
the risks to regional and strategic stability, reducing the danger of escalation from limited clashes 
in areas where military forces operate in close proximity to each other, cooperating on 
counterterrorism, and preventing nuclear proliferation.  
 
Conventional Postures 
Russia’s current force posture points to a preoccupation with local contingencies on its borders 
with non-NATO neighbors, rather than a desire to engage in a large-scale conflict with 
U.S./NATO forces.45 Russian concerns include a potential Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the absence 
of a political settlement around Crimea, vulnerability of Kaliningrad, and instability in post-
Soviet “frozen conflict” areas.46 Analyst Ruslan Pukhov has argued that “Russia at present is not 
threatening NATO and not modernizing or positioning forces in ways that threatens the Baltics 
(even though they are actively getting ready to defend against a putative Russian invasion). At 
the same time, NATO is reacting and pretending that its ‘defensive’ efforts are not directed to 
also pressure Russia on the Ukraine issue.”47 That said, Russia is exercising for a variety of 
possible contingencies and developing mobile capabilities that could allow a quick response to 
the theater. Russia is also using its military forces to coerce and demonstrate strength, just as 
strategic deterrence proponents have argued.48 However, some of these analysts also argue that 
any U.S. posture changes in Europe are inherently provocative.  
 
Across the spectrum of opinion, there has been a discussion of the dangers that could arise from 
routine military activities. One analyst has argued that the “proximity of Russian and Western 
military infrastructures and equipment has the potential to undermine strategic stability,” while 
suggesting that “imitating attacks is unacceptable” for both sides.49 Another has noted the danger 
of “increased conflict potential due to U.S.-Russian disagreements over Ukraine and Syria 
(Western efforts to impose no fly zones, Russian actions against terrorists located on territory of 
a U.S. ally, and conflict between Russia and a NATO ally).”50 
 
Proponents of restraint wanted Russia to signal its willingness to re-engage the West by 
accepting proposals on conventional arms control and transparency, including potentially 
agreeing to lower the notification thresholds in the Vienna Document. Some have noted that 
Russia’s 2016 proposal on military aircraft transponders was constructive, even though NATO 
was not ready to respond positively. 51 Others have called for the creation of a “force free zone” 
in the common border area and noted the importance of the Incidents at Sea Agreement and the 
Preventing Dangerous Military Activities Agreement.52 Still others have highlighted the “need to 
develop a new conventional arms control concept, which would have lower ceilings for systems 
controlled under [the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty], development of categories for new 
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So far, Russian officials have pushed back on Western Vienna Document proposals. They have 
argued that conventional arms control will become possible when both sides feel the need for it. 
And, they noted that, Russia will pursue it when force modernization allows it to “discuss arms 
control from a position of strength.”54 How Russian government plans to implement defense 
budget cuts will affect its position on conventional arms control remains unclear.  
 
Nuclear Arms Control and Missile Defense    
Proponents of restraint posited that it is important to extend New START’s limits and 
verification and transparency provisions, especially because the United States is on the cusp of 
initiating nuclear modernization.55 Some have also argued that further nuclear reductions to 
1,000 warheads and 500 deployed launchers could be acceptable to Russia.56 Others considered 
the absence of an arms control process to be detrimental to both sides, especially since arms 
control shaped Soviet learning about U.S. doctrine in the past. 57   
 
Proponents of strategic deterrence did not argue against strategic nuclear arms control per se, but 
asserted that further nuclear cuts are not in Russia’s interest. On nonstrategic nuclear weapons, 
they focused on the importance of including Great Britain and France in any future 
negotiations.58 One analyst also posited that, instead of arms control, engagement needs to focus 
“on transparency, trust building, and reduction of potential for accidents using nuclear weapons.” 
And, instead of militarizing the bilateral relationship even further, there was a need to refocus on 
multilateral discussion about strategic stability.59  
 
Some proponents of restraint have written about the need for high-level political statements to 
reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. One analyst suggested reaffirming that “a nuclear war cannot 
be won and must never be fought.”60 Another championed agreement to curb reliance on early 
warning systems for second strike, noting that, while such an agreement could not be verified, it 
could be important for strategic stability and the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review (NPT).61 
Another proposal for cooperation included further improvement in nuclear transparency among 
the P5, where Great Britain and France could lead and share data analogous to Russia and the 
United States and also encourage China to participate.62  
 
Aspects of the ongoing Russian debate about the INF Treaty are related to NATO missile 
defense. Many proponents of strategic deterrence view the treaty as no longer being in Russia’s 
interests for a variety of reasons. Some posit that the European Phased Adaptive Approach 
infrastructure could be used for offensive strike purposes.63 Others remain concerned that a 
combination of U.S. conventional cruise missiles, prompt global strike capabilities, and missile 
defense threatens Russian second-strike capabilities.64  
 
Proponents of restraint generally countered some of these assertions by arguing that the United 
States “cannot just ‘reprogram’ missile launchers and interceptors, but concede that there is no 
transparency and Russia wouldn’t know whether a Tomahawk is put into it or not.” 65 Some 
analysts argued that the U.S. would not seek to destroy Russian command and control because 
that would mean loss of centralized control over Russian strategic and nonstrategic nuclear 
weapons, and would also not prevent Russia’s launch of a second strike.66  There was a general 
consensus across this group that on-site access could be used to resolve INF treaty compliance 
concerns for both sides. In this approach, the United States could gain access to Russian bases to 
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assess Iskander missile ranges in exchange for Russian access to verify Mk-41 launchers. They 
also viewed continued efforts at missile defense cooperation, along the lines of those proposed 
by the EASI initiative, as very important in U.S./NATO-Russian relations moving forward. 67  
 
Another heated topic for discussion was whether Russia was involved in an arms race. To be 
sure, Russia’s President Putin has publicly denied that this is the case. Proponents of strategic 
deterrence often focused on the need for asymmetric capabilities rather than direct competition 
with the West. However, supporters of Russian restraint argued that Russian strategic 
procurement was not necessarily driven solely by the threat environment. One analyst questioned 
the wisdom of procuring seven different types of intercontinental ballistic missiles.68 Another 
noted that there may be different arms race strands, including Russian strategic nuclear weapons 
and dual-use systems versus U.S. missile defense; long-range precision, hypersonic, and boost 
glide systems; and Russia’s own development of air/missile defense. He argued that these are all 
expensive, especially given Russia’s critical need to strengthen general purpose forces. 69  
 
Given Russia’s development and demonstration of a long-range precision strike capability, many 
strategic deterrence proponents have explored potential concepts of operations involving these 
systems. Some have argued that Russian doctrine needs to clearly allow for preventive strikes 
with conventional precision strike systems.70 On the restraint side, some analysts have called for 
thinking about how these systems fit into the bilateral notions of strategic stability and 
developing relevant trust-building measures and notification regimes.71  
 
Other Strategic Stability Challenges 
Across the Russian spectrum of opinion, there was substantial consensus about dangers from 
nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and cyber weapons, and strategic stability issues, 
including the potential for dialogue with China. One proponent of strategic deterrence expressed 
concerns that nuclear weapons could be used by a third country (e.g. North Korea) in a limited 
way, thus destroying the post-World War II consensus about nuclear deterrence.72 Similarly, he 
noted the dangers of non-state actors acquiring cyber weapons.73 Proponents of restrain also 
posited that “nuclear terrorism remains a threat to strategic stability” as does continued 
proliferation of nuclear weapons.74 Others argued of the presence of new threats at the “nexus of 
terrorism, WMD, and cyberattacks.”75  
 
On nonproliferation and the nuclear architecture more broadly, even Russian analysts in favor of 
restraint note their continued frustration with the inability of the United States to ratify the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.76 There were further concerns about the potential collapse of 
the NPT and fears that the United States will seek to destabilize the nuclear deal with Iran.77   
 
Another emerging issue for Russian security experts was the importance of initiating dialogue 
with China. Some proponents of strategic deterrence argued that Russia needs to prioritize 
strategic stability discussions with China.78 Among proponents of restraint, some analysts had 
concerns about the emergence of a threat to Russia from China’s nuclear and missile programs.79 
Still others posited the importance of initiating trilateral discussions involving Russia, the United 
States, and China, on hypersonic systems and their impact on strategic stability. 80 To be sure, 
while trilateral “strategic stability” talks appeared politically impractical as of this writing, 
Russian analysts clearly viewed this as an important avenue of dialogue for the future.   
	





This paper began with the premise that in the United States, the broader analytical community 
has largely struggled to understand the drivers of Russia’s recent political-military behavior. The 
paper’s goal was to outline two differing perspectives on U.S./NATO-Russian relations from 
across the Russian political-military community’s writings in 2014-2016. This concluding 
section summarizes findings and offers a summary table.  
 
Key Findings  
• Russian analysts differ on the reasons behind the current chasm between Russia and the 
West. Some focus on the role of the Ukraine crisis, analyzing it through the prism of 
concerns about Western activities aimed at creating political instability and engagement 
in military conflicts that have resulted in regime change. Others note that Russia’s actions 
as well as those of the West contributed to the current security situation. 
 
• Many analysts discuss the missed opportunities to transform the deterrence relationship 
during the Obama administration. These are chiefly centered on strategic arms control 
and missile defense. One point of consensus is that the West’s unwillingness to take into 
consideration Russian interests and concerns was a key contributing factor to the current 
state of play. 
 
• Moving forward, Russia will be faced with the question of whether to define its role in 
the region and on the world stage in positive or negative terms.  There is agreement that 
Russia and the West have some areas and forums in which limited cooperation is both 
prudent and desirable.  
 
• As Russia continues to pursue modernized conventional and nuclear capabilities and 
work out concepts of operations, there are disagreements about threats, needs, and wants. 
Some analysts and officials still see benefits in transparency and risk reduction 
frameworks for conventional weapons. In the areas of bilateral and regional nuclear arms 
control and missile defense, the future is much less certain, given the political obstacles 
on both sides. An even greater challenge lies in determining whether Russia is engaged in 
an arms race with the West in certain types of technologies, and what is required to 
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Summary Table 
The following table summarizes the key arguments discussed above. 
 Strategic Deterrence Restraint  
Nature of the 
Relationship 
-West views stronger Russia as a 
danger and seeks to keep it isolated 
and weak 
-West did not take into account 
Russia’s interests as it should have 
with an equal partner 
-Ukraine conflict -Ukraine is a West-induced 
“hybrid” conflict 
-Russia overreacted to prospect of 
Ukraine’s membership in NATO 
-Russia’s role in 
region 
-Russia has a key role in Europe, 
and needs to develop strong 
military capabilities so that it is no 
longer pushed around by West and 
to use them as leverage 
-Russia needs to show restraint 








-Russia has a key role in Europe, and there needs to be some cooperation, 
especially to reduce risks of inadvertent escalation  
-Missile defense -Missile defense, especially in 
Europe, is threatening to Russia and 
is a provocation 
-Iran nuclear deal should have led 
to a Western policy change on 
missile defense 
-There is no current threat from 
U.S./NATO missile defense (U.S. 
also cancelled SM-3 Block 2B) 
-West was unwilling to alleviate 
Russia’s political-military 
concerns on missile defense 
-Nuclear arms 
control  
-Negotiations on nonstrategic 
nuclear weapons were not in 
Russia’s interests 
-Western position on missile 
defense led to inability to move 
forward on nuclear arms control 
Cooperative 
Steps Forward 
-This may not be the time for new arms control, but preserving existing 
arrangements and discussing ways to reduce risks may be beneficial 
-Conventional 
postures 
-Western posture changes are a 
provocation 
-No need for conventional 
transparency on Russia’s part or 
arms control until Russia can 
discuss from a position of strength 
-Russia needs to signal by 
engaging on conventional arms 
control and transparency (VDOC, 




-Russia’s past preconditions on 
arms control remain in place 
-Further strategic nuclear arms not 
wise, instead focus on trust building 
and reduction of potential accidents 
with nuclear weapons 
-INF Treaty may not be in Russia’s 
interests 
-Further strategic nuclear 
reductions are possible; 
discussions need to take place  
-INF Treaty needs to be preserved 
- Russia’s nuclear modernization 
efforts are driven in part by action-
reaction dynamics and/or internal 
acquisition pressures  
-Other strategic 
stability issues   
-Reducing nuclear dangers from third parties; threats at nexus of 
terrorism, WMD, and cyber  
-There are possibilities for trilateral strategic stability discussions (US-
Russia-China), including on hypersonic systems 
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Balancing Coercion and Restraint 
To date, Russian officials have expressed very limited expectations of breakthroughs in U.S.-
Russian relations in the near term. After the U.S. election, they anticipated more continuity than 
change from the Trump administration in U.S. efforts to develop missile defense, modernize 
nuclear weapons, as well as a “continuity with regard to NATO summit statements at Wales and 
Warsaw.”81 And, unless relations take a turn for the absolute worst, Russian approaches will seek 
to build primarily on the strategic deterrence perspective while also seeking opportunities where 
Russia’s security could be enhanced through some aspects of restraint.  
 
A pure strategic deterrence strategy on the part of Russia would essentially consist of faster 
progress on the downward trajectory that has characterized recent relations with the West. This 
would emphasize continued coercive demonstrations of military forces and non-military 
approaches that, as some Russian analysts maintain, allow Russia to engage in future 
negotiations from a position of strength. Another key feature of this strategy could be a renewed 
active conflict in Ukraine. Russia could also abrogate existing nuclear arms control accords. 
 
One of the key features of a strategy based on greater restraint would be positive progress on 
Russia’s part in Ukraine as well as signaling that Moscow is interested in engaging in 
discussions on conventional security issues with the West (including risk reduction and sub-
regional risk reduction in the Baltics). Russia could also exercise positive leadership through 
proposals to reduce nuclear dangers and discuss the implications of emerging technologies for 
strategic stability.  
 
Some say that Russia is not likely to move towards greater restraint without first receiving 
credible assurances from the West. But that is unlikely to happen so long as the United States 
and NATO see Russian aggression as the root cause of current security problems. In this regard, 
proponents of strategic deterrence have also argued that Russia has tried restraint in the past, and 
there were no indications that this strategy succeeded. To the contrary, they note that restraint 
made Russia look weak. Such a strategy would fundamentally also rely on U.S./NATO restraint 
in kind, and, as they continue to deter and counter Russian coercive efforts, U.S./NATO 
policymakers need to induce and publicly recognize Russian steps toward and signals of 
restraint, if any are present.  
 
The first step on both sides could involve serious discussion about the difficulties of crisis 
management. A mutual commitment to reduce the dangers of unintended nuclear escalation also 
needs to be an important part of the strategic dialogue. Preserving existing New START limits as 
well as predictability and transparency arrangements will also be important as nuclear 
modernization proceeds in both Russia and the United States. 
 
All that said, perverse incentives for the current course are now in place, thus making windows 
of opportunity for positive progress even smaller. The absence of resolution of numerous 
U.S./NATO-Russian agenda items, coupled with a general lack of trust and respect in the 
relationship, will continue to contribute to an increase in the risk of conflict. This makes restraint 
and positive leadership in key areas of regional and global security on Russia’s part all the more 
timely and important.  
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